Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Federal Law Project
Jodie Hemerda
University of Colorado at Denver
P-AD 5001/ P-AD 7001
Professor Robert W. Gage
ABSTRACT
In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use military force to
defend the United States from the potential “threat posed by Iraq in its efforts
to develop weapons of mass destruction and its support for international
terrorism, and to enforce all relevant UN Security Council resolutions” (Thomas,
2002).
The legislative history of Public Law 107243 reaches back to the end of the Gulf War when President George H. Bush pulled military forces out of Iraq before removing Saddam Hussein from power.
While the U.S. maintained its policy of containment toward Iraq, the September 11 terrorist attack in 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings left Americans feeling vulnerable about their national security. Terrorized by CIA intelligence outlining the threat posed by Iraq, Congress acted on behalf of the majority of Americans and passed Public Law 107243 in October 2002.
Citing the ineffectuality of renewed United Nations’ inspections, the United States military began its “Shock and Awe” campaign in Baghdad on March 19, 2003. Though the United States’ occupying forces handed over the governing functions to an interim Iraqi government in June 2004, the United States’ military continues to maintain the largest supporting force ever in a foreign country.
Public Law 107243 and its ensuing military action
have killed more than 950 American soldiers, more than 200 coalition soldiers,
and more than 11,000 Iraqi civilians (Iraqi body count).
This investigation of the Iraqi war resolution, its history and consequences
will lead to an examination of the ultimate question, “Is America safer than
before the war?”
In 1992, the United State’s current Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, serving under Defense Secretary and now Vice President Dick Cheney proposed a “new strategy for the nation’s role in the world in the 21 century,” specifically aimed at dealing with a post-Gulf War Iraq (Morales & Hurd, 2003).
[The Defense Planning Guidance] called for the
United States to use military force if necessary to maintain its position as the
only remaining superpower. Furthermore, when collective action wasn’t possible,
it said the United States would act independently and preemptively against
states suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. (Ibid)
Ten years later President George W. Bush submitted the White House Discussion
Draft “Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States armed Forces
against Iraq,” requesting the power to use such independent preemption against
Iraq. On October 16, 2002 the President received that authority when he signed
bill H. J. Res. 114 into Public Law 107243. Within six months, President Bush
had ordered a full-scale military attack against Iraq.
This paper will reveal how the Bush Administration gained the consent of Congress and the American people for military action against Iraq, the provisions of this law, and its impact.
The history of Public Law 107243 began with the cease-fire agreement of the Gulf War. “February 28, 1991 President Bush called a halt [sic] when Iraq agreed to carry out the requirements of twelve U.N. resolutions which included unconditional withdrawal” (Grant, 1993, 384). The United Nation’s cease-fire resolution, UNSCR 687, required Iraq to do the following:
• Respect the Kuwait boundary,
• Allow a U.N. unit to monitor specified demilitarization zones,
• “Unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision” of its weapons of mass destruction programs,
• “Unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above,”
• Return property seized from Kuwait,
• Financially compensate those that incurred costs due to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, repatriate Kuwaitis and other third country nationals,
• “Not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism” (1993).
With the resolve of the Gulf War, the United States, France, and Great Britain began monitoring “the no-fly zones” in Northern Iraq, and subsequently Southern Iraq. The first of these operations came in the form of Operation Provide Comfort, which
[P]rovided relief to the Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq and protection for humanitarian relief efforts. It began on April 6, 1991 and ended July 24, 1991. Operation Provide Comfort II was a show of force to deter new Iraqi attacks on the Kurds and had only limited humanitarian aspects. Provide Comfort II began July 24, 1991 and ended December 31, 1996. (Chun, 2003)
The United States European Command then stepped in with Operation Northern Watch,
[T]he Combined Task Force (CTF) charged with enforcing the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq and monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687, and 688. The northern no-fly zone was not an aggression against Iraq or a violation of its sovereignty, it was a necessary and legitimate measure to limit Iraq's aggressive air activities. (2004)
Following the same reasoning,
President George Bush announced Aug. 26, 1992, a decision by a coalition of U.N. forces to begin surveillance operations in Iraq below the 32nd parallel. The goal was to ensure Iraq’s compliance with UNSCR 688. To facilitate the monitoring, the coalition barred all Iraqi fixed and rotary wing aircraft from flying over the surveillance area. With the president’s announcement, U.S. Central Command activated Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, a command and control unit for coalition forces monitoring the no-fly zone. The mission was dubbed Operation Southern Watch. (Pike, 2003)
Numerous groups and individuals argue the legality of the ensuing bombings that occurred during the decade enforcement of the no-fly zones. The Institute for Public Accuracy claims that no authorization to militarily enforce UNSCR 687 exists, and that the establishment of the no-fly zones violated Iraq’s sovereignty (2002). Even the United Nations legal department announced in 1993 that it could find no existing Security Council resolutions authorizing the United States, Britain, and France to enforce the no-fly zones (Mooney, 2002). Regardless of the validity of the no-fly zones, air strikes culminated in Operation Desert fox in December 1998 in response to increased pressure from an influential group, the PNAC.
The Project for a New American Century (PNAC) formed around the notion of America’s global leadership. These influential members of the current Bush Administration were among its founding members:
• Elliott Abrams, Chief of Middle Eastern affairs at National Security Agency
• William J. Bennett, speech writer for President Bush
• Jeb Bush, Governor of Florida and brother of President Bush
• Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United States
• Richard Perle, Resigned as chair of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board in March of 2003 due to conflict of interest scandal, but remains on the board
• Karl Rove, influential presidential advisor
• Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense
• Paul Wolfowitz, United States Deputy Secretary of Defense
• I. Lewis Libby, Cheney's top national security assistant
• John Bolton, who serves as Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security in the Bush administration
• Randy Scheunemann, President of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq
• Bruce Jackson, Chairman of PNAC, a position he took after serving for years as vice president of weapons manufacturer Lockheed-Martin, and who also headed the Republican Party Platform subcommittee for National Security and Foreign Policy during the 2000 campaign
• Dov Zakheim, Comptroller for the Defense Department
• John Bolton, Undersecretary of State (Pitt, 2003)
In a 1998 letter to President Clinton, many of these PNAC members and others pushed for a new strategy in Iraq,
The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy. (Wolfowitz et. al., 1998)
This pressured a reluctant Clinton Administration to sign the Iraq Liberation Act and authorize Operation Desert Fox. The Iraq Liberation Act’s goal consisted of ousting Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and instilling democracy in Iraq. This Act was well funded, as discussed by Senator Brownback in 1999, “$97 million [sic] was authorized in drawdown for the Iraq Liberation Act, and I believe there was also appropriated an additional $13 million to support opposition to Saddam” (Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate, 1999). At the time of the 1999 hearing, only $317,000 of the $110 million had been spent. This lack of spending signifies the reluctance of the Clinton Administration to pursue swift, reckless implementation of the Iraqi Liberation Act. Instead the administration continued to fund educational and nonmilitary projects like Radio Free Iraq, which worked to place a radio transmitter inside Iraq and transmit anti-Hussein broadcasts (Burns, 2002).
PNAC demands then pushed President Clinton to take a military stand regarding Iraq restricting access to UNSCOM weapons inspectors. The Institute for Public Accuracy notes that, “[C]onfirmed cases of intrusive espionage," by the inspectors led to an impasse, which led the U.N. to remove the inspection team from Iraq (2002).
Sam Hussein, communications director of the Institute for Public Accuracy: "UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq by issuing a trumped-up report which provided a pretext for the U.S. bombing campaign Desert Fox in December 1998. Some may recall this occurred on the eve of President Clinton's scheduled impeachment vote. UNSCOM was not only used for espionage, but also as an excuse for bombing. It delegitimized itself as an instrument of weapons inspections." (The Institute for Public Accuracy, 2002)
The limited military campaign of Operation Desert
Fox resulted in Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen declared the operation a
success,
We've degraded Saddam Hussein's ability to deliver chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons. We've diminished his ability to wage war against his neighbors.
Our forces attacked about 100 targets over four nights, following a plan that
was developed and had been developed and refined over the past year. We
concentrated on military targets and we worked very hard to keep civilian
casualties as low as possible. Our goal was to weaken Iraq's military power, not
to hurt Iraq's people. (1998)
Though President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act and authorized Operation Desert Fox, their limited approach and lackadaisical implementation left many feeling frustrated. According to PNAC member Gary Schmitt,
The list of what Hussein has done during Clinton’s watch is long: an attempt to assassinate former president Bush, a threat to re-invade Kuwait, a program to continue developing weapons of mass destruction, an attack on American-backed Iraqi opposition forces, a successful effort to curtail and then end U.N. weapons inspections, and a global campaign of terrorism against the United States. (2000, 1)
Numerous congressional leaders agreed with the PNAC’s criticism of the Clinton Administration’s lack of Iraq policy. Senator Sam Brownback chaired the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate in March 1999 during the hearing on U.S. policy toward Iraq, where he discussed the problem of Saddam Hussein, “[H]e and his henchmen have disposed of a prominent Shi’ite cleric and his son. They’ve eliminated some of the top ranks of the military and have brutally suppressed dissension in the south of Iraq.” Then Senator, Attorney General Ashcroft criticized, “Keeping our forces on the front lines in the Persian Gulf without focused and committed political leadership in Washington is a disservice to the soldiers and it undermines American credibility abroad” (Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate, 1999).
In January 2000 the PNAC did not issue any formal letters to the new administration, none were needed. The newly appointed President Bush incorporated numerous PNAC into the highest of his national offices. The importance of resolving the Iraq issue topped the Bush/Cheney Administration, as revealed by former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, “[T]he overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was ‘Topic A’ at the first National Security Council meeting of the new administration” (Martin, January 2004, 1).
From the start, we were building the case against Hussein and looking at how we could take him out. It was about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The President saying, ‘Fine. Go find me a way to do this.’ (Ibid)
While Bush turned his administration’s focus toward Iraq, he ignored mounting evidence of an al Qaeda threat. Former counter-terrorism coordinator Richard Clarke revealed Bush’s vigor to invade Iraq the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
On September 12, 2001, when Bush took Clarke and several aides aside in the White House Situation Room and told them to review evidence that the Iraqi president was involved in the attacks on New York and Washington. This was not a demand to be thorough and explore all possible avenues of investigation, Clarke recalled. Bush spoke “testily” and was “intimidating.” Clarke told “60 Minutes,” “He never said, ‘Make it up.’ But the entire conversation left me in absolutely no doubt that George Bush wanted me to come back with a report that said Iraq did this.” (Martin, March 2004, 1)
Though Clarke has failed to be so bold, others have
claimed that Bush’s Iraq focus left the country vulnerable to the 9/11 attacks.
While the amassed intelligence quelled Bush’s initial pursuit of Hussein, the
September and October anthrax scare gained him support. When congressional
leaders and news reporters received envelopes tainted with the deadly anthrax
virus in the weeks following 9/11, the American intelligence community and media
outlets initially looked for an Iraq connection. Representative Hyde from
Illinois brought these expert testimonials with him to the debate surrounding
H.J. Res. 75, Regarding Monitoring of Weapons Development in Iraq,
Just 2 weeks ago, our committee received testimony from two of our Nation’s leading experts on biological weapons. These experts, Dr. Richard Spertzel and Dr. Ken Alibek, agreed that there was most likely state involvement in the anthrax attacks that our Nation has experienced, and that the most likely state to have been involved was Iraq. (Thomas, 2001)
The majority of evidence exposed the anthrax as
American in origin, but the suggestive testimony of these experts began a
fifteen-month campaign of misleading the United States to war with Iraq (White,
2002).
In December 2001, members of the House of Representatives revisited legislation
to renew weapons inspections in Iraq and face the decade-old question of what to
do about Saddam Hussein. Many in Congress felt that the United States had left
unfinished business in the Persian Gulf when the U.S. military withdrew from
Iraq without removing Saddam Hussein from power, such as California
Representative Rohrabacherfelt during the debate surrounding H.J. Res. 75,
Regarding Monitoring of Weapons Development in Iraq.
Ten years ago, the United States of America and our allies blew it. We had the opportunity to eliminate a major threat to world peace and world stability and a major dictator and tyrant to the people of Iraq, and we did not do the job. We did not finish the job.
Now is the time for us to finish that job. (Thomas, 2001)
While their discussion of H.J. Res. 75, “Regarding inspection and monitoring to prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,” failed to make it out of the Senate’s foreign relations committee after passing the House, it did renew congressional discussion about the future of Saddam Hussein.
Though hawks like Wolfowitz, Cheney, and Bush occupied the White House, it took the dual wave of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax mailings to gain Congress’ unyielding support. Together, those two events changed the way most Americans viewed foreign threats, and ultimately how they viewed the U.S. foreign policy of containment of Saddam Hussein. Rather than feel comfort in their oceanic borders, Americans now realized that terrorists could reside as sleeper cells in their social and business institutions, in their cities, even in their own neighborhoods.
Few Americans felt secure in this new era of fear. Attorney General John Ashcroft swiftly introduced the USA Patriot Act to further investigative practices on suspected terrorists. The newly appointed director of homeland security, Tom Ridge, created a color-coded terror alert system to inform Americans of potential terrorist attacks. Terror saturated the post September 11th year, evident in media headlines, airport screenings, and President Bush’s national addresses.
We also must never forget the most vivid event of recent history. On September the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability – even to threats that gather in the other side of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America. (Bush, 2002)
Richard Pearle, Paul Wolfiwitz, and others of the PNAC led the administrative call to war, but without clear evidence linking Hussein to 9/11 or the anthrax scare, President Bush needed Congressional approval before answering that call. In September 2002, the White House released a 20-page document, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance.” This report chronicled the threat of Saddam Hussein and the U.S.’s inability to eliminate said threat. Days after its release, the White House sent a draft resolution authorizing the use of the United States Armed Forces Against Iraq.
The 2002 debate surrounding the consequential Resolution H.J. Res. 114 focused on whether the President would be given authorization for a preemptive and unilateral strike, or deployment as part of a larger multinational effort to implement and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and Minority Leader Richard Gephardt introduced H.J.Res. 114 on October 2. The Committee on International Relations marked it up and reported it to the larger body on October 7.
Debate in the Senate began with S.J.Res. 45, introduced by Senators Daschle and Lott on September 26. S.J.Res. 46, introduced by Senator Lieberman and others on October 2, superseded Daschle-Lott, and was nearly identical to H.J.Res. 114. While several other bills were introduced, two draft proposals shared the focus of Senate debate: a Senate proposal drafted by Senators Biden and Lugar – ranking members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – circulated on September 30, and a proposal circulated by Senator Levin and others the first week of October. H.J. Res. 114 and S.J. Res. 46 differed from these Senate draft proposals.
In the fact-stating but non-binding “whereas” clauses, H.J.Res. 114 refers to Iraq’s nuclear weapons development program, Congress’ 1998 declaration finding Iraq in “material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations,” Iraq’s human rights record, the 1993 attempt to assassinate former President Bush, possible links to al Qaida, and the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction in the post-September 11 political environment. The House proposal also cites Congress’ authorization of use of military force in 1991 (P.L. 102-1), support for regime change in 1998 (P.L. 105-338), and authorization for use of military force in the war against terrorism immediately following September 11, 2001 (P.L. 107-40) as building blocks logically laying the precedent for an authorization of use of military force against Iraq. (Rennack, 2002)
In contrast, the Senate proposals focus mainly on
Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missiles
program. The proposals also varied considerably in their binding sections.
H.J.Res. 114/S.J.Res. 46 would grant broad authority to the President to “use
the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and
appropriate...against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.”
The Biden-Lugar proposal requires that any military action taken against Iraq be to enforce U.N. Security Council resolution 687 (calling for the dismantlement of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile program), or to defend the United States or its allies against Iraq’s use of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile program. Biden-Lugar, furthermore, requires that the President consult with congressional leadership prior to engaging U.S. military force, and that certain conditions have been met. Biden-Lugar requires the President to prepare follow-up reports on plans to reconstruct Iraq, economically and politically, following the use of force. Finally, the Levin proposal focuses almost entirely on working through the United Nations. It would authorize the use of U.S. military force, but only pursuant to a new U.N. Security Council resolution, and only after consultation with congressional leadership.
Since the President declared Iraq part of an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, tensions have increased between the legislative and executive branches over just what that means and what is to be done about it. Resolutions have circulated on Capitol Hill since mid-summer beginning with a call on Congress to “consider and vote on a resolution authorizing the use of force by the United States Armed Forces against Iraq before such force is deployed against Iraq.” (H.J.Res. 109, introduced July 26, 2002, by Representative DeFazio and others). Subsequent proposals have become increasingly focused on only Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. Differences of view remain on regime change, Iraq’s links to terrorism, the viability or seriousness of Iraq’s threat of weapons of mass destruction, and unilateral action v. coalition building. (Rennack, 2002)
Amidst the debate of these resolutions, on October 7, 2002 President Bush outlined the Iraqi threat in a national address.
The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime's own actions -- its history of aggression, and its drive toward an arsenal of terror. Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq's eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith.
In addition to the difficulty of conducting true, open-minded debate in Congress, the Bush Administration introduced this legislative conversation four weeks before the 2002 elections. President Bush encouraged Americans to contact their congressional leader in his national radio address,
American security, the safety of our friends, and the values of our country lead us to confront this gathering threat. By supporting the resolution now before them, members of Congress will send a clear message to Saddam: His only choice is to fully comply with the demands of the world. And the time for that choice is limited. Supporting this resolution will also show the resolve of the United States, and will help spur the United Nations to act.
I urge Americans to call their members of Congress to make sure your voice is heard. The decision before Congress cannot be more consequential. I'm confident that members of both political parties will choose wisely. (2002)
The resulting Public Law 107243 authorized the
President to use military force to defend the United States from a potential
“threat posed by Iraq in its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and
its support for international terrorism, and to enforce all relevant UN Security
Council resolutions,” unilaterally and preemptively (CIS, 2002). This piece of
legislation is filled with faulty intelligence, “Whereas members of al Qaida...are
known to be in Iraq;” and faulty law claiming the authority to use military
force to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolutions,
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorized the use
of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660
(1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain
activities that threaten international peace and security, including the
development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United
Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its
neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 949 (1994). (Thomas, 2002)
Public Law 107243 required that within 48 hours of exercising this authority President Bush had to, “[M]ake available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that,
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and
(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. (2002)
On March 18, 2003, before the beginning of Operation Iraq Freedom, President Bush followed the letter of the law and notified Congress that,
I determine that:
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic and other peaceful means alone will neither (A) adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq nor (B) likely lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and
(2) acting pursuant to the Constitution and Public Law 107-243 is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. (2003)
In accordance with the reporting section of Public Law 107243, President Bush contacted Congress within forty-eight hours of the start of the war,
I have reluctantly concluded, along with other coalition leaders, that only the use of armed force will accomplish these objectives and restore international peace and security in the area. I have also determined that the use of armed force against Iraq is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. United States objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338).
Within weeks of this memo Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld addressed the Senate Appropriations Committee and House Appropriations Committee -- Subcommittee on Defense, “The President has submitted a supplemental request of $74.7 billion. It includes $62.6 billion for the Department of Defense to support military operations in Iraq and throughout the global war on terror” (2003). This led to the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, introduced in the House as H.R. 1559 and signed by the President on April 16, 2003, becoming Public Law 108-11, which actually appropriated $78 billion (Belasco & Nowels, 2003). In November 2003 Congress added an additional $87 billion funding through the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, introduced in the House as H.R. 3289 and signed by the President on November 6, 2003, becoming Public Law 108-106 (Daggett, Nowels, Tarnoff, & Margesson, 2003).
The final section of Public Law 107243 consisted of the reporting requirements of the President.
The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338). (2002)
Consistent with this obligation, President Bush has
provided the necessary reports every 60 days. As of March 2004 the President
began consolidating reporting of the War on Terror with reporting on Iraq.
Interestingly, his March 2004 report provided no update on Iraq.
As the drums of war began beating in late 2002, the majority of Americans stood
faithfully behind President Bush. Little by little a steady voice of dissent
rose throughout the United States and the world. People marched in the streets
protesting the seemingly inevitable war on Iraq. Never before had the world come
together to stand in opposition to a war that had not yet begun. But as unity
coalesced among the dissenters, the harmonious oneness that had enveloped post
9/11 Americans disintegrated. As March 19, 2003 approached, the division of
those for and those against the war grew. Those for the war repeated
intelligence reports that linked Hussein and 9/ll. They quoted President Bush,
It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. (2002)
Those against the war demanded hard evidence to back up weak and often misleading statements about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and al Qaeda links.
Even before President Bush declared war on Saddam
Hussein, his dissemination of misinformation started to catch up with him. The
declaration in his October 2002 and State of the Union 2003 national addresses
that Hussein had purchased nuclear material from Africa had been proven false.
Former UNSCOM weapons inspector Scott Ritter disputed Bush’s claims that Hussein
had renewed Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. Uncorroborated and
conflicting intelligence reports failed to connect Hussein or Iraq to al Qaeda
or the 9/ll terrorist attacks.
After the initial military attack on Iraq in March 2003, United States weapons
inspectors confirmed that Hussein had not renewed his weapons programs. The
brutality of the Hussein regime remains the only untainted reason for going to
war with Iraq.
The Bush Administration and their PNAC friends have
successfully destabilized the entire Gulf region with their strategy to maintain
America’s global leadership. An international rift now exists between the United
States and many of its former allies. Once respected in the world, the United
States now appears more the bully than the humanitarian.
Public Law 107243 authorized President Bush to use military force against Iraq.
The immense political and financial influence of this resolution will resonate
among numerous generations. The consequence of using unilateral preemption could
lead to the nuclear holocaust feared the world over. Without the moral authority
of following the United Nations rules of engagement, who is the United States to
dictate to Pakistan, India, North Korea, and China the importance of nuclear
disarmament?
President Bush and his administration claim they have made the world safer by ousting Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. But who feels safer with insurgent fighting and acts of terrorism in Iraq, where American soldiers face death and dismemberment daily, and America has lost respect among the international community? Will the Bush Administration return to a policy of containment, or will it follow the PNAC mission statement and continue this path of independent preemption in the name of American global leadership?
APPENDIX A
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate)
One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America AT THE SECOND
SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, the twenty-third day of
January, two thousand and two
Joint Resolution
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.
Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal
occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to
liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the
United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating
to Iraq;
Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United
Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally
agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its
support for international terrorism;
Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States
intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had
large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons
program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that
was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had
previously indicated;
Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to
thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally
resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;
Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq's
continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States
interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in `material
and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and urged the
President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and
relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its
international obligations';
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the
United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region
and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations
by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical
and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons
capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security
Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population
thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing
to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by
Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property
wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness
to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;
Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility
toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in
1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of
occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;
Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks
on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;
Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist
organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of
United States citizens;
Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the
gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by
international terrorist organizations;
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass
destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those
weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed
Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the
extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its
citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to
defend itself;
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use
of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660
(1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain
activities that threaten international peace and security, including the
development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United
Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its
neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);
Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution
(Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President `to use United States
Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990)
in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662,
664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677';
Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it `supports the use
of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),' that Iraq's repression of its
civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and
`constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the
Persian Gulf region,' and that Congress, `supports the use of all necessary
means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688';
Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense
of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts
to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a
democratic government to replace that regime;
Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to
`work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge'
posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions,' while also making
clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just
demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable';
Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and
Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its
development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its
obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council
resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the
United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the
use of force if necessary;
Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism
through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to
take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist
organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all
appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist
organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in
order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use
of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and
Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore
international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region: Now, therefore, be
it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the `Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002'.
SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.
The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the President to--
(1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and encourages him in those efforts;
and
(2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that
Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and
strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the
United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to--
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq.
(b) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION- In connection with the exercise of the authority
granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such
exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours
after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination
that--
(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means
alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead
to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq; and
(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United
States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against
international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations,
organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements-
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War
Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this joint resolution
supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) REPORTS- The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the
Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including
actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the
status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such
actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338).
(b) SINGLE CONSOLIDATED REPORT- To the extent that the submission of any report
described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report on
matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to
Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution
(Public Law 93-148), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated
report to the Congress.
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- To the extent that the information required by section
3 of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public
Law 102-1) is included in the report required by this section, such report shall
be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of such resolution.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.
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